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Abstract

Bioweapons programs have existed since their development during the Cold War. These
biowarfare programs initially utilized naturally occurring pathogens capable of infecting crops,
livestock populations, and human populations. Anthrax is a widely exploited bioagent
responsible for attacks ranging from the Germans’ deployment in World War I to the mailing of
anthrax through the postal service in attempts on U.S. senators’ lives. With the development of
genetic manipulations, the Soviet Union began modifying anthrax to resist detection and
treatment. With the continued advancement of science and technology, a new bioagent has
entered the scene – the man-made chimeric virus. Chimeric viruses typically only infect a certain
species, however with genetic alteration they develop characteristics required to infect other
species. SARS-CoV-2 and its apparent genetic changes could prove a prime example of how a bat
virus underwent genetic mutations that allow it to infect humans. Ultimately, SARS-CoV-2
reveals how chimeric viruses are the bioweapons of the future.
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SARS-CoV-2 Reveals that Chimeric Agents are the Bioweapons of the Future
Poisons have long been utilized in assassinations throughout history, and the rise of
microbiology in the late 1800’s fostered the development of comprehensive bioweapons
programs during the World Wars. After the World Wars in the Cold War Era, while the world
was transfixed on the race to get the first man in space and the race for nuclear superiority,
another, more covert race was taking place: the race to develop the most lethal bioagents and to
subsequently stockpile bioweapons capable of mass destruction. In response to the rapid
developing and stockpiling of bioweapons, nations – including the United States – came together
to form the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which sought to eliminate research of
bioagents intended for use in weapons of mass destructions, demanded the halt of stockpiling
bioweapons, and necessitated the proper disposal of previously constructed bioweapons.
However, while the major powerhouse nations of the bioweapons race signed and ratified the
Biological Weapons Treaty, it would benefit the United States defense organizations to assume
that Russia and China have not halted the research and production of lethal bioagents. Thus, to
ensure the effective upholding of U.S. biodefense and biosecurity, the question remains as to the
focus of modern bioweapons research.
While the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is still widely disputed, the specific genetic
alterations in this virus grant valuable insight as to the potential for the future of bioweapons
research. Originally, the SARS-CoV-2 virus backbone seems to have been derived from the bat
RaTG13 virus, which raises the question as to how this bat virus is capable of infecting humans
and leading to a global pandemic. The answer lies in several genetic mutations in the SARS-CoV2 virus that gave rise to a furin cleavage site, allowing the SARS-CoV-2 virus the ability to infect
human lung cells and lead to a systemic infection in humans. Interestingly, furin cleavage sites
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are common in the most infectious bioagents – such as the widely weaponized pathogen anthrax
– as the cleavage site allows the bioagents to receive activation signals from the furin protease
enzyme, a molecule that is ubiquitous in all human tissues (Braun, 2019). While SARS-CoV-2
may not have been intentionally developed as a bioweapon, its expressed genetic modifications
demonstrate that laboratories are researching and developing chimeric viruses and the biodefense
implications of this research must be addressed.
It is important to note that the purpose of this paper is not to claim that China released
SARS-CoV-2 as an act of biowarfare or even to develop it as a biowarfare agent. Rather, it is the
intent of this paper to analyze the potential for the genetic modifications exhibited by the SARSCoV-2 virus to translate to biowarfare and the implications of that translation. The Covid-19
pandemic has wreaked havoc on nations around the globe, and the scientific community has
devoted countless hours and resources to investigate the genetic mutations that granted this virus
human ACE2 receptor binding specificity. Thus, it is only logical that nations developing
modern bioweapons programs would also be researching this and looking for the potential to
translate these alterations into biowarfare agents. This paper seeks to establish why chimeric
viruses are one of the focuses of modern-day bioweapons programs.
Introduction to the Biology and Classification of Bioagents
CDC Categories of Bioterrorism Agents
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) distinguishes three different
categories of biological agents: Category 1, Category 2, and Category 3 bioterrorism agents.
Category 1 bioterrorism agents are the highest threat to national security and have the highest
priority for study. Agents within this category are defined as those pathogens which “can be
easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have
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the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and
require special action for public health preparedness” (Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2018). These agents include pathogens such as anthrax, botulinum, smallpox, and
plague. Category 2 biowarfare agents have the second highest priority and are defined as those
agents that “are moderately easy to disseminate; result in moderate morbidity rates and low
mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capacity and enhanced
disease surveillance” (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). Finally, Category 3
bioagents are defined as those “emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass
dissemination in the future because of availability; ease of production and dissemination; and
potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact” (Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2018).
Pathogens’ Lethality Increases Due to Modern Genetics
The rise of modern genetics has not only increased the potency of Category 1 agents, but
it has also created the potential for those pathogens originally in Category 2 and 3 to be elevated
to Category 1 status as the genetic modifications result in increased lethality. The Soviet Union’s
Biopreparat program is a prime example of how modern genetics was applied to produce
increasingly deadly bioagents. The Biopreparart had three goals when genetically altering a
pathogen (Davis, 1999).
First, the pathogen should be altered in a manner that would permit it to withstand harsh
environments. This would allow a pathogen to be deployed virtually anywhere in the world by
enhancing its resiliency. Pathogens should also be able to avoid detection by surveillance
systems. One such modification could occur through the alteration of primer sequences within
the genetic code of the pathogen. Normally, primers are the regions that are bound and promote
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the initiation of sequencing; since these regions are conserved within the same organism, the
same primers can be utilized to identify that organism. However, the modification of the primers
would produce a strain of pathogen that the normal primers would not adhere to, making it
increasingly difficult to identify the pathogen used in an attack. The final goal through genetic
modification was to develop strains which were impervious to medical treatment (Davis, 1999).
Today, there are strains of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Bacillus mallei (glanders), Bacillus
pseudomallei (melioidosis), Yersinia Pestis (plague), and Francisella tularensis (tularemia) that
are resistant to normal methods of treatment (Cote, 2020).
Modern Genetics Allows Creation of Chimeric Viruses
Chimera viruses are viruses containing nucleic acids from two or more different
organisms, the impact of this being that a virus typically attributed to infecting one species now
has the ability to have a high affinity for another species. Genetic engineering has allowed
viruses originally classified as Category 3 bioagents to be elevated to Category 1 status. An
example of this is the SARS-CoV-2 virus which seems to have been originally the RaTG13 bat
CoV virus (which did not have a high affinity for human receptors) but through a series of
recombination events obtained spike proteins with a high specificity for human ACE2 receptors.
This concept of chimera viruses is not new to the scientific community. The Soviet Union’s
Biopreparat in the 1980’s and 1990’s instituted the “Chimera Project” which sought to uncover a
method to combine two different viruses to make a more potent bioweapon against humans by
increasing the affinity to human receptors (Alibek, 1999).
Additionally, laboratories in China – specifically the Wuhan laboratories – have been
researching chimera coronaviruses since 2007 when the laboratory successfully transferred the
spike proteins from the human SARS-CoV virus to segments of bat CoV genetic backbones. This
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granted the segmented portions of the bat virus the ability to bind human ACE2 receptors via the
transferred viral proteins. The University of North Carolina in 2008 modeled these same
chimeric modifications in a live version of the virus by adding the human SARS-CoV spike
proteins to a live version of the bat viral backbone (as opposed to the segments of the virus tested
by Wuhan in 2007). Thus, a live SARS-CoV chimera was manufactured. In 2015, a paper was
published demonstrating Wuhan’s collaboration with the University of North Carolina and
subsequently detailing the successful formation of additional chimeric CoV viruses (Segreto,
2020). These genetic advancements have created a whole new playing field for biowarfare, and
in order to effectively analyze the current trajectory of modern bioweapons programs, it is
essential to first understand from a historical perspective the developmental progression of
offensive biological weapons programs.
Historical Analysis of International Bioweapons Program Development
Utilized for assassinations from the very beginnings of documented history, poisons have
long posed a threat to human life; however, comprehensive biological weapons programs did not
pose a substantial threat until Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur provided the scientific community
with a foundation in microbiology in the 1800’s. This background in microbiology furnished the
knowledge necessary to begin honing biological agents for large scale military usage
(Frischknecht, 2003). The World Wars provided the appropriate setting for scientifically
advanced nations to test biological agents on a large-scale platform.
While Germany was the first nation to deploy weapons of mass destruction, they failed in
their attempts to instigate a widespread infection of livestock and food supplies with anthrax
during World War I as their attacks produced minimal effect on the targets. The usage of
chemical warfare agents in World War I prompted the formation of the Geneva Protocol in 1925
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which prohibited the release of both chemical and biological warfare agents during a war
(Bernstein, 1987). However, this protocol did not prohibit the research and development of
chemical and biological warfare agents, and thus did nothing to thwart the development of
substantial biological and chemical warfare programs.
Soviet and Japanese Bioweapons Program Development
The first truly effective and comprehensive biowarfare programs were developed in the
Soviet Union in 1928 and Japan in 1930 under the directions of Vladimir Lenin and Shiro Ishii,
respectively. Shiro Ishii started his research in the Tokyo Army Medical School and utilized
World War II as an opportunity to brutally test his developed pathogens on Chinese citizens and
prisoners of war. At the height of the Japanese bioweapons program during this period, over 600
humans were killed annually in just one of the twenty-six test facilities from being cruelly
subjected to human studies (Frischknecht, 2003).
Simultaneously, the Soviet Union was rapidly advancing their arsenal of bacterial and
viral pathogens but had not yet established an effective delivery system for the pathogens. This
changed at the conclusion of World War II when the Soviet military obtained Japanese
biowarfare documents detailing the Japanese biological weapons models as well as two books
from the United States written by Theodor Rosebury detailing the United States’ plans for
deploying biological agents (Leitenberg, 2014). These documents provided the Soviet Union
with the necessary arsenal to effectively distribute biological agents in a large-scale attack and
their research over the next several decades provided the foundation required for the formation of
the Biopreparat – one of the largest bioweapons programs the world had ever seen (Leitenberg,
2014; Frischknecht, 2003).
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American Bioweapons Program Development
During World War II, the Chemical Warfare Service in the United States began devoting
limited quantities of its resources to the research of biological weapons, however, this research
was widely kept secret and the President of the United States was unaware of its existence. It was
not until Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the
advantages of a biological weapons program that one was officially created. This program was
formed as the War Research Service in 1942 and was headed by George W. Merck – chemist and
president of the Merck & Co. pharmaceutical company (Bernstein, 1987).
The formation of the War Research Service (WRS) permitted the expansion of the
biological weapons program in the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), as funds from the WRS
were reallocated to the projects at the CWS. Increased funding for the CWS allowed the
programs to extend into research facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland. By the end of 1943, the
CWS was rapidly developing a 500-pound anthrax bomb that contained smaller bomblets
intended to disperse fatal pulmonary anthrax (Bernstein, 1987). The predominant focus of the
program was weaponizing the anthrax and botulinum toxins given these agents tended to exhibit
resilient characteristics, quickly proliferated, and had a very short incubation period. However,
the U.S. bioweapons program received massive backlash from the general public during the antiwar movement in the Vietnam War era, and President Nixon vowed to abolish both biological
and chemical weapons programs in 1969.
Biological Weapons Convention and Biopreparat
In 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention was formed. This convention sought to
institute an international treaty signed by the majority of nations around the world (including the
United States, the Soviet Union, and China). The goal of the treaty was to prohibit the research
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and development of pathogens that could be utilized in an offensive attack as well as prohibit the
stockpiling of biological weapons. Despite the formation of the treaty, countries remained in
violation of the BWC – one of the most prominent examples being the Soviet Union and the
formation of their Biopreparat (Frischknecht, 2003). The Biopreparat was developed just after
the initiation of the BWC in 1972 and at the height of its activity, the Biopreparat employed over
50,000 people (Frischknecht, 2003). Suspicious activities in the Soviet Union such as the release
and subsequent outbreak of inhalation anthrax from a military weapons facility in Sverdlovsk in
1979 alerted the United States to the fact that the Soviets were continuing to strengthen their
biological arsenal. This prompted the United States to respond by expanding the American
biological weapons arsenal as well (Bernstein, 1987).
Anthrax: Historical Case Study of One of the Oldest Biowarfare Agents
One of the very first pathogens utilized in biowarfare, Bacillus anthracis – more
commonly known as anthrax – has plagued the field of agriculture through the infection and
subsequent decimation of livestock populations. Generally, anthrax spores contaminate the feed
and are ingested by cattle or elk, resulting in death of the animals. However, the development of
modern biological weaponry programs discovered that anthrax is also extremely potent to
humans if inhaled. There are three main forms of anthrax exposure: ingestion,
inhalation/pulmonary, and cutaneous. For humans, the deadliest form of exposure is through
inhalation as the pulmonary anthrax results in lesions on the lungs, necrosis of the tissue, and
eventually suffocation leading to death. Since anthrax has long been utilized as a biological
warfare agent, a detailed study of this historical agent provides the foundation for researching
novel and emerging biowarfare agents.
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Cellular and Genetic Structure of Anthrax
Gram positive and rod-shaped, the Bacillus anthracis organism is a single-celled, sporeforming bacteria that contains a single chromosome accompanied by two virulence plasmids.
Studies have revealed that the chromosome does little to impact the toxicity of anthrax and has
concluded that without the presence of the pXO1 and pXO2 plasmids, anthrax would not be
toxic to humans. The pXO1 and pXO2 plasmids provide the genetic code responsible for the
formation of the poly-D-glutamyl capsule which shields the organism from the immune system
of the host it is invading as well as codes for the three factors that complex in order to form the
toxins responsible for necrosis of tissues (Laws, 2016).
Anthrax Invasion of Host Cells
pXO2 codes for a poly-D-glutamyl capsule that allows the anthrax organism to evade
phagocytotic responses by B cells, dendritic cells, and macrophages in the host immune system
as well as making the bacteria impervious to bactericidal serums produced by the host (Splino,
2005). Once the anthrax organism successfully invades the host, the pXO1 plasmid produces the
protective antigen, edema factor, and the lethal factor. Independently, these three factors have
little impact on the host, but once the edema factor and the lethal factor couple with the
protective antigen, they form the edema toxin and the lethal toxin, respectively (Hepburn, 2007).
Protective Antigen Forms Pore Allowing Anthrax Toxins into Host Cells
The protective antigen facilitates the movement of the edema toxin and the lethal toxin by
associating into heptamers that form a pore in the membrane of the host cells, allowing the
transport of the edema toxin and lethal toxin. Upon coming into contact with the host cells, the
83 kDa protective antigen binds to the anthrax receptors known as tumor endothelial marker 8
(TEM8, ANTXR1) and capillary morphogenesis gene 2 (CMG2, ANTXR2) (Friebe, 2016).
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Normal functions of these receptors are not widely understood, however, the binding of the
protective antigen to these receptors not only initiates the oligomerization of the protective
antigen components, but it also dictates where the proteins that were internalized through
endocytosis are released within the cell. Binding of the receptors initiates cleavage of the 83 kDa
protective antigen by furin-like proteases to a 63 kDa form of the protective antigen. Upon being
cleaved, the 63 kDa protective antigen will oligomerize and form a heptamer complex on the
surface of the cell – only the cleaved form of the protective antigen is capable of oligomerizing
(Shlyakhov, 1997).
In order for the protective antigen to facilitate the movement of the lethal factor and the
edema factor it must be in its clustered, heptamer form. Once clustered, the lethal factor and
edema factor can bind to the protective antigen. Clathrin-mediated endocytosis internalizes the
entire hetero-oligomeric toxin-receptor complex using an endosome. The low pH within the
endosome results in a conformational change of the protective antigen heptamer, which forms a
pore in the membrane of the endosome. This permits the movement of the lethal toxin and the
edema toxin into the cytoplasm of the host cell (Shlyakhov, 1997).
Lethal Toxin and Edema Toxin Cellular Functions
The lethal antigen is a zinc metalloprotease that cleaves the N-termini of mitogen
activated protein kinases kinases (MAPKKs) belonging to the MEK family. The MEK kinases
are essential for the regulation of the ERK, JNK, and p83 pathways responsible for the
regulatory functions of the cell pertaining to cell function, growth, and stress response.
Deactivation or inhibition of these pathways through the cleavage of the MAPKKs results in a
major disturbance of normal cell activity (Shlyakhov, 1997).
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The edema factor is a highly efficient calmodulin-dependent adenylyl cyclase that greatly
increases the turnover of AMP to cAMP, which can act as a secondary messenger that leads to
cell death. Both of these factors inhibit an early immune response, allowing the invasion to
progress into later stages. The later stages of the anthrax toxins lead to tissue necrosis and cell
death; prolonged duration of infection increases the damage to tissues and eventually leads to the
death of the host (Shlyakhov, 1997).
Anthrax in Biological Outbreaks and Bioterrorist Attacks
Anthrax remains one of the longest offensively utilized biological agents in history as it
was one of the first pathogens tested when nations were initiating their BW programs in the early
1900’s. Two specific attacks and outbreaks in recent decades have highlighted just how potent
anthrax is and how detrimental it is to human populations. In 1979 a military research facility
specializing in microbiology in Sverdlovsk, Russia experienced a containment breach and leaked
inhalation anthrax through the vents of the facility. The anthrax spores were carried through the
air into the town, infecting the citizens within the city and resulting in the deaths of
approximately 66 civilians. In 1998, tissue samples from 11 of the victims of the Sverdlovsk
outbreak were obtained and it was determined through sequencing the DNA that there were four
different genetic variants of the anthrax in the outbreak. Natural outbreaks of anthrax would have
resulted in a single strain of the pathogen being recovered, thus the presence of four variants
allowed researchers to conclude that on some level, genetic engineering of anthrax was occurring
within the military complex (Ainscough, 2002).
Additionally, in 2001, the United States experienced a series of bioterrorist attacks when
a powdered form of anthrax was distributed through the U.S. postal service just after 9/11. The
series of attacks led to the deaths of five individuals, the infection of 17, and targeted several
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high-profile persons such as Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman Rush Holt. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with the help of the U.S. Army Medical Research Facility
ultimately concluded that the anthrax strain within the envelopes contained the Ames strain of
anthrax – the reference strain of anthrax – and was not genetically altered. The FBI also
concluded that the different envelopes contained varying purities of anthrax, suggesting that the
individual or group responsible for the attack had been culturing and successfully developing
several aliquots of the RMR-1029 anthrax culture (Majidi, 2008).
Mentioned previously, when hostile nations such as the Soviet Union sought to
genetically modify anthrax the goal was to engineer a strain that would bypass defense systems,
persist in the environment, be undetectable by diagnostic testing, and be untreatable by existing
medical antibiotics. The motive behind all these modifications were to ensure that when
deployed the pathogen would have the highest infection rates against human targets. This is a
common theme in the genetic engineering of bioweapons – to ensure that it has maximum effect
by increasing specificity against the target.
SARS-CoV-2 and its Genetic Variances
SARS-CoV-2 – also known as COVID-19 and the Coronavirus – has resulted in a
pandemic over the last two years that has wreaked havoc on the entire globe not only through a
public health crisis but also by massively impacting economies. The effort to effectively combat
SARS-CoV-2 has prompted scientists in government, industry, and academia to band together and
research the infection mechanism of Covid-19, its pathogenicity, and the potential for vaccines to
protect vulnerable populations. This research has demonstrated that there remain two unique
attributes to SARS-CoV-2 that have not been previously seen in other Sars-CoV strains. In order
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to appreciate the significance of these cellular modifications it remains essential that the
infection mechanism of SARS-CoV-2 is understood.
Cellular and Genetic Structure of SARS-CoV-2
SARS-CoV-2 is a single stranded positive RNA virus approximately 29.9 kilo-base pairs
long belonging to the Coronaviriae family in the betacorona 2B lineage. It is made of four
structural proteins beginning with the nucleocapsid proteins which make up the capsid
surrounding the viral genetic material (Wang, 2020). The envelope is made of the three
additional structural proteins: the membrane proteins, spike proteins, and envelope proteins.
Beyond the structural proteins SARS-CoV-2 produces 16 non-structural proteins. Probably one of
the most essential proteins for the virus, the spike protein consists of two non-covalently bound
subunits referred to as the S1 and S2 subunits. The S1 subunit contains the N-terminal domain
and the receptor binding domain (RBD), which is essential for binding the human ACE2
receptor. The S2 subunit is made of a fusion peptide, heptad repeat 1, central helix, connector
domain, heptad repeat 2, transmembrane domain, and a cytoplasmic tail (Figure 1). This subunit
is responsible for fusing to the membranes of the host cells for binding via the RBD. Between
the S1 and S2 subunits there is a cleavage site that is required for activation of the proteins via an
irreversible conformational change promoting the active binding state (Wang, 2020). In the
SARS-CoV-2 virus, the virus is activated through cleavage by the protease enzyme furin, an
ubiquitous enzyme in humans.
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Figure 1. Model of the S protein subunits for S1 and S2. (A) Shows the S protein in its closed
conformation and (B) shows the S1 protein in the upright position so that it is able to bind the
ACE2 receptor. (C) Displays the different domains of the S protein in the following order: SS –
single sequence, NTD – N-Terminal Domain, RBD – Receptor Binding Domain, SD1 –
Subdomain 1, SD2 – Subdomain 2, S1/S2 – S1/S2 cleavage site, S2’ – S2’ protease cleavage
site, FP – fusion peptide, HR1 – heptad repeat 1, CH – central helix, CD – connector domain,
HR2 – heptad repeat 2, TM – transmembrane domain, CT – cytoplasmic tail. Arrows show
where the protease cleavage sites are. Figure adapted from (Wang, 2020).
Cellular Infection Mechanism of SARS-CoV-2
Binding a receptor is the first step that SARS-CoV-2 must take in order to gain entry into
human host cells and initiate the infection process. Research has demonstrated that the SARSCoV-2 virus binds the human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 receptor, also known as ACE2
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through viral spike protein contact with the receptor (Harrison, 2020). The spike protein found
on the surface of SARS-CoV-2 is heavily glycosylated and is classified as a trimeric class I fusion
protein. Structure of this spike protein includes three S1 protein receptor heads mounted on a S2
protein stalk. These S1 proteins display two different orientations that dictate whether the spike
protein is able to bind a host cell or not. When the S1 protein is in the down position (Figure 2A),
the virus is not able to bind the host cell (Figure 2B), which allows it to maintain a state that aids
in its evasion of the host immune system. S1 protein upward orientation (Figure 2C) results in a
spike protein activated to bind the ACE2 receptor on the surface of the host cell (Shang, 2020).
The RBD on the surface of the virus is dependent on the targeted cells producing TMPRSS2 and
cathepsin L in order for the S1 protein to be activated and primed for a binding event with a
receptor (Harrison, 2020).
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Figure 2. Molecular conformations of the S1/S2 spike protein and subsequent binding
effectiveness. (a) Displays the S1 subunit in the downward position which in turn prevents
binding to the human ACE2 receptor as shown in (b). (c) shows the S1 protein in the upward
position which allows for binding to the ACE2 receptor, leading to entry and to the infection of
the host cells. Figure modified from (Yesudhas, 2021).
Receptor Binding Domain has High Affinity for Human ACE2 Receptor
Studies have demonstrated that the point mutations on the receptor binding domain
(RBD) of the SARS-CoV-2 virus compared to other Sars-CoV viruses creates a higher binding
affinity between SARS-CoV-2 and the human ACE2 receptor as the altered structure of the spike
protein results in closer contact between the spike protein and its receptor (Harrison, 2020).
Current scientific theory is that the SARS-CoV-2 virus contains a RaTG13 viral backbone – the
CoV strain specific to bats. While the RaTG13 does have the potential to bind the human ACE2
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receptor, this occurs at a much lower affinity and lower strength than the SARS-CoV-2 virus (Liu,
2021). Additionally, SARS-CoV-2 displays a higher binding affinity to the ACE2 receptor than
seen with the Sars-CoV virus. While this is not necessarily indicative of a stronger bond (in fact,
research has shown that the Sars-CoV virus has a stronger bond to the ACE2 receptor), it is more
likely to bind the ACE2 receptor due to its conformational variation (Harrison, 2020). The
Harrison research group indicates that the difference in binding strengths between SARS-CoV-2
and Sars-CoV virus could be the result of the two different orientations manifested by the S1
proteins on the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, meaning that the downward positioning of the S1
protein makes it less accessible.
Novel Furin Cleavage Site on SARS-CoV-2 Creates Potency in Additional Human Tissues
However, a new binding site at the S1/S2 junction known as the furin cleavage site
accounts for the decreased accessibility from the downward positioning of the S1 spike protein
as it also enhances the affinity of the virus for human cells. The furin cleavage site ensures that
the virus is less dependent on host cell machinery, and it allows the virus access to varying tissue
cells that it would not normally have access to. Coronaviruses normally rely on the presence of
host cells expressing TMPRSS2; when TMPRSS2 and host enzyme cathepsin L are expressed
the ACE2 receptor permits entry of the virus into the host cells. However, SARS-CoV-2
experienced an addition of a furin cleavage site, enabling the virus to be preactivated through
cleavage and able to bypass the requirement for TMPRSS2 and cathepsin L (Harrison, 2020).
Receptor Binding Domain Point Mutations of SARS-CoV-2
China and the United States have long been researching the possibility of creating crossspecies viruses – also referred to as chimeric viruses – that would allow a virus characteristic to
one species to jump from species to species, increasing the rate of infection. Generally, the
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coronavirus has been seen presented in bats, and is typically referred to as the RaTG13 strain.
Since 2007, the Wuhan Institute of Virology has been studying the potential for bat viruses to be
genetically modified in such a way that would allow these pathogens to infect humans (Segreto,
2020). Specifically, the goal was to modify the spike protein in such a way that it removed the
bat proteins and attach new proteins to the surface of the spike proteins so that the virus’s
receptor binding domains would have a high affinity for human receptors. RaTG13 was not
previously observed infecting humans, rather the purpose of this study was to modify the virus in
a manner that would allow its spikes to bind human receptors. The Wuhan research team was
able to accomplish this goal and created several new strains of the bat virus that were capable of
infecting humans.
Throughout the research into the origin of SARS-CoV-2 and the modifications of the
receptor binding domain proteins, it was noticed that while the backbone of the virus was nearly
identical to that of the RaTG13 virus with a reported similarity of 96.2% (Figure 3), the spike
proteins were not as similar between the strains (Lv, 2020; Flores, 2020). This prompted the
search for a natural intermediary host that would have facilitated the movement of the virus from
bats through the intermediary host to humans. Research found that the RBDs on the SARS-CoV-2
were almost identical to the spike proteins found on the pangolin strain (referred to as the MP789
strain) presenting a 97.2% amino acid similarity (Figure 4) between the two strains while the
amino acid similarity between RaTG13 and MP789 was only 89.2% (Han, 2020).
Binding studies were conducted analyzing the affinities for the SARS-CoV-2 RBD for
cellular receptors on bat, pangolin, and human receptors. It was determined that the RBD on
SARS-CoV-2 maintained the highest binding affinity for human ACE2 receptors over pangolin
receptors. The high affinity for humans again points to highly specific changes in the RBD spike
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proteins that granted the virus the ability to have a significant affinity to human receptors
compared to those RBDs found in the RaTG13 and the MP789 strains. Additionally, it was
observed that the RaTG13 does not bind to the pangolin ACE2 receptors, which is the equivalent
receptor that the SARS-CoV-2 binds to in humans (Segreto, 2020).

Figure 3. Chinese horseshoe bat responsible for RaTG13 virus and genetic similarity to SARSCoV-2. (A) Depicts a Chinese horseshoe bat that is the primary host for RaTG13 strain of the
coronavirus. (B) Shows there is a high whole genomic similarity between the RaTG13 virus and
Sars-CoV-2 at 96.2%. Figure modified from (Yong, 2013).
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Figure 4. Chinese pangolin responsible for MP789 virus and its genomic similarity to SARSCoV-2. (A) Depicts a Chinese pangolin (an anteater like animal) that is the primary host for the
MP789 strain of the coronavirus. (B) Shows that there is a high similarity between the RBD of
MP789 to the RBD of SARS-CoV-2. Figure modified from the Zoological Society of London.
Table 1.
Percent Similarity of Receptor Binding Domain (RBD) Genomic Region to the Pangolin
MP789.
RBD Nucleotide Similarity to Pangolin MP789

RBD of MP789

RaTG13

SARS - CoV - 2

89. 2 %

97.2%

Note. Data was taken from (Han, 2020).

CHIMERIC VIRUSES

24

Table 2.
Percent Similarity of Whole Genome Sequences to SARS-CoV-2 Virus.
Whole Genome Nucleotide Similarity to SARS - CoV - 2

SARS - CoV - 2

RaTG13

MP789

96.20%

85 - 92 %

Note: Data was taken from (Flores, 2020).
Evidence of Man-Made Chimeric Creation
Lack of Pangolin Population Limits Opportunity for Natural Recombination Event
Researchers have proposed that the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus – which presents with
a RaTG13 genetic backbone and MP789 spike proteins – could have originated through natural
recombination events between the RaTG13 strain and the MP789 strain. Pangolin population and
habitat studies have recently revealed that the pangolin population in China has greatly declined
over the last several decades to the point that they are considered almost extinct in some regions
due to habitation loss and the marketing of these animals for their scales.
In the past, the Hubei province of China has recorded established populations of
pangolins in the northwestern region, specifically in the Shiyan City as well as the Danjiangkou
and Fangxian counties (Zhang, 2022). However, these counties are located in the northwestern
portion of Hubei, and Wuhan – the place of origin for Sars-CoV-2 – is situated in the
southeastern portion of the province approximately 250 miles away from these locations. While
from a genetic perspective the proposed recombination events are possible in a natural setting,
the lack of a viable pangolin population that would be required in the Wuhan region to facilitate
this type of recombination event makes it highly unlikely that this event occurred.
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Addition of Furin Cleavage Site on SARS-CoV-2
Analysis of the activation method of the SARS-CoV-2 spike proteins revealed a furin
cleavage site that has not been previously seen on other coronavirus strains. The presence of the
furin cleavage site is significant given furin is ubiquitous in all human tissues, which decreases
the virus’s reliance on host cell machinery for activation and permits it to enter tissues that it
would not typically have access to. Activation of the spike proteins via the presence of furin is
what grants the SARS-CoV-2 virus the ability to infect human lung tissue as well as initiate a
systemic infection throughout the body.
The genetic code responsible for the furin cleavage site was the 12 nucleic acid sequence
5’-T-CCT-CGG-CGG-GC - 3’ that was inserted at the S1/S2 junction (Figure 5A). This 12
nucleic acid sequence is not present in any other Sarbecoviruses, and bioinformatic analysis
demonstrated that this addition of the nucleotides had to have come by means of an insertion –
not through a frameshift or deletion (Diegen). What researchers have found unusual about this
insertion is that two arginine residues are coded for by CGGCGG which is not the predominant
codon for arginine in either the SARS-CoV-2 or the RaTG13 strains. In fact, approximately only
5% of arginine amino acid residues are coded for with the CGG sequence, and yet in this
insertion two back-to-back CGG additions are observed (Segreto, 2020). Thus, this poses the
question as to why in a 12 nucleic acid insertion, 6 of those 12 nucleotides are in an arrangement
that is rare in the genomic sequence of coronaviruses.
Closer examination of an amino acid codon chart reveals that the amino acid arginine is
one of two amino acids that can be coded for by six different codons. The codon usage table
establishes that in nature, the CGG codon is used for arginine only 11% of the time (Figure 5B).
Nature uses what is readily available to it, which means that the tendency would be to utilize the
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more predominant codons such as CGT and CTC which are both utilized 36% of the time. It
seems unlikely that nature would repeat a codon only experienced 11% of the time twice in a
row in an insertion mutation. In fact, repeated patterns of codons tend to be attributed to manmade cloning techniques especially when utilizing a rare codon sequence. Due to the low
probability of the CGG codon occurring multiple times in nature, this 5’ – CGG-CGG – 3’ repeat
points to the insertion sequence being constructed and manually inserted into the SARS-CoV-2
virus.

Figure 5. Alignment of MP789, RaTG13, and SARS-CoV-2 reveals a 12 nucleic acid insertion in
the SARS-CoV-2 virus. (A) This figure displays the 12 nucleic acid insertion in the SARS-CoV-2
virus showing that this sequence was not present in the MP789 virus nor the RaTG13 virus. It
illustrates the repeated CGG codon for arginine. (B) This figure is an excerpt from a codon usage
table and reveals that the CGG codon for arginine is only seen used in nature 11% of the time.
The more predominant codons for arginine are the CGT and CGC codons which are both
observed 36% of the time in nature. Figure (A) modified from (Segreto, 2021) and Figure (B)
modified from (NCBI – GenBank, 2007).
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Implication of Genetic Alterations
Ultimately, new genetic modifications displayed in SARS-CoV-2 demonstrate that the
virus experienced a series of mutations that granted it a higher affinity for binding human ACE2
receptors, creating a chimeric virus. Not only does the spike protein have a great affinity for
binding and infecting human cells, the addition of the furin cleavage site permits the virus to now
enter and infect a myriad of human tissues that it did not previously have access to, including
lung tissue. This modification results in the virus now having the capability to produce a
systemic infection within patients. Additionally, viral spike proteins are less reliant on having the
proper human cell machinery present for activation as furin is naturally occurring in all human
tissues. Lack of a pangolin population in the Wuhan area seems to limit the probability of a
naturally occurring recombination event between the RaTG13 strain and the MP789 strain to
create a virus with the RaTG13 backbone and the MP789 spike proteins. This suggests the
possibility of genetic manipulation.
The Common Denominator: Furin Cleavage
Furin is a serine protease that is ubiquitous in all human tissues. Disorders involving this
protease have been linked to the development of tumors and cancer, and given its production by
human tissues, it is commonly exploited by viruses and bacterial pathogens as a means for
activation and entrance into host cells (Braun, 2019). In many cases with viruses and bacterial
pathogens, the furin cleavage for activation is not a requirement but rather something that makes
the pathogen much more infectious. Historically utilized as an offensive bioagent, anthrax
contains a furin cleavage site that allows it to activate its toxins, increasing the toxicity of the
bacteria. Furin successfully cleaves and activates the protective antigen, promoting the entry of
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the pathogen into the host cell and the subsequent formation of the edema toxin and the lethal
toxin.
It is interesting that the historically utilized bioagent anthrax contains a furin cleavage
site and the SARS-CoV-2 virus had a novel insertion that produced the furin cleavage site
resulting in a more infectious strain of the coronavirus. The furin cleavage site is not required for
viral entry and infection of human cells, but it grants the SARS-CoV-2 virus access to lung tissue
and ultimately makes it more potent against humans as it is able to lead to a systemic infection.
While this could be a naturally occurring insertion, the precise location of the insertion coupled
with the CGG codon for arginine and the RBDs with high binding affinity for human ACE2
receptors seems to indicate an intent to engineer a more infectious coronavirus strain for humans
by altering the coronavirus with these modifications. It further supports the need for continued
investigation into the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the possibility of its originating in a
laboratory rather than a natural setting.
Bioterrorism Implications for the United States
If the SARS-CoV-2 virus arose in a laboratory, it would have major biodefense and
biosecurity implications for the United States. Firstly, the United States would need to address
the fact that genetic engineering opens the door to a wide variety of new viruses and bacterial
pathogens that can be genetically weaponized through modifications intended to increase the
lethality within human populations. Whether or not the SARS-CoV-2 virus was genetically
engineered to be a bioweapon or not, it was a virus that was modified to increase human
infection rates through the addition of RBD spike proteins specific to human ACE2 receptors.
This should spark the question as to why China would need to research the potential to alter a
virus previously inert to humans to a chimeric strain now capable of infecting humans to a higher
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degree. If the SARS-CoV-2 virus was genetically engineered, it would not be the first time China
worked on this type of project as a chimeric coronavirus project was funded in Wuhan
laboratories in 2007 in collaboration with the United States. This should also raise the question
of whether China is now in violation of the biological weapons convention and if they are, how
the United States should seek to respond.
Evolving technologies generate advanced delivery systems for bioagents permitting a
more targeted release of an agent. The SARS-CoV-2 virus does not appear to have any pinpointed
dispersal target as it has resulted in a global pandemic; however, the genetic modifications within
this virus should cause the United States to consider how other pathogens might be modified and
coupled with a high-tech dispersal system to infect specific target bases. The last decade has
seen the development of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and subsequently the
introduction of a new biowarfare dispersal system. These UAVs have the ability to fly under the
radar of typical defense monitoring systems and can be outfitted with deployable bioweapons
(Hoenig, 2014). Additionally, drones are already utilized to spray antibiotics on crops in an
agricultural setting. In the same way the aerosol outbreak occurred through a ventilation system
in Sverdlovsk, it would be feasible to outfit agricultural drones with a bioagent, allowing the
dispersal of an aerosolized strain of virus or bacteria.
Ultimately, there are still many questions revolving around the origin of the SARS-CoV-2
virus. Comparing this virus to a bacterial pathogen long utilized as a bioweapon demonstrates
that the insertion of the furin cleavage site seems to suggest more than natural origins for this
virus. This places the United States biodefense and biosecurity fields in a pivotal position as they
have the opportunity to choose to learn from the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 and research how to
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better safeguard against future genetic modifications of other bioagents, addressing the
increasing threat of evolving dispersal systems.
Though genetic mutations and the lack of a pangolin population in Wuhan – as well as
Wuhan’s history of researching SARS-CoV virus’s potential for chimeric mutations – suggests
that the SARS-CoV-2 virus may have laboratory origins. This paper sought to highlight the
potential for the development of future offensive bioagents with similar chimeric features to
those of SARS-CoV-2. Some would argue that the reason scientists need to make chimeric
viruses is so the medical community can be adequately equipped for potential outbreaks due to
naturally arising chimeric infections through recombination events. However, the heightened
specificity and affinity for the ACE2 receptors noted in the coronavirus and the continued
research of chimeric viruses in laboratories escalates the risk of a biocontainment breach
resulting in a pandemic. This should promote increased funding for the United States’ biodefense
programs in order to generate solutions to mitigate the fallout from attacks with chimeric viruses.
The Unites States can effectively prepare for a chimeric attack with solutions ranging from the
creation of rapid tests to more advanced detection systems that can efficiently identify the
genomic components of viruses. Ultimately, development of viruses with chimeric
characteristics are becoming increasingly prevalent as evident with modifications present in
SARS-CoV-2, and thus it remains imperative for American biodefense and biosecurity that the
United States acknowledge that chimeric viruses are the bioweapons of the future.
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